

**ARGENTINE
HOPE**

The first and most spectacular prize of the Central Intelligence Agency is about to escape the clutches of the corruption-intimidation-and-assassination outfit. That prize is Argentina, where, back in September 1955, a CIA-sponsored military clique overthrew President Juan Domingo Peron, who had been re-elected to a second term of office in 1951. The crime of Peron, to whom the "responsible" news media in this country kept referring as "dictator," in spite of the overwhelming support his fellow-countrymen repeatedly gave him at the polls, was that he had refused to join in the "crusade" against National Socialist Germany and had told President Franklin Roosevelt to mind his own business, when F.D.R. sought to dictate his policies to Argentina.

For 18 years the various CIA-sponsored regimes, including military *juntas* and presidents elected while Peron was barred, have tried hard to make the Argentine people forget the swashbuckling colonel who had become a social reformer, but all in vain. Economic deterioration has equated national demoralization and has now grown into desperation leading to an incipient revolt. President Alejandro A. Lanusse and his junta, in an effort to appease the populace, have scheduled presidential elections for March 25, 1973 and have arbitrarily ruled that all presidential candidates must be in Argentina by August 25 this year. Peron, who barely escaped the CIA noose in 1955, has refused to fall into their entrapment scheme and has declared from his Madrid exile that he is ready to return home if the Argentine people want him. This puts the regime of Lt.-General Lanusse on the spot: absence makes the heart grow fonder and if Peron's name is kept off the ballots, he will get in write-in votes the biggest landslide of his career, according to an astute Argentine diplomat in Washington.

This counter-move of Peron was not anticipated by Mr. Nixon's foreign policy mentor, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, in spite of his control of the CIA and of the availability to him of all their information and evaluations.

Stanley Kauffmann on films

The Hour of the Furnaces

(Third World Cinema Group)

Ramparts of Clay

(Cinema V)

The Hour of the Furnaces is a film phenomenon and a phenomenal film. This Argentine documentary runs four hours and twenty minutes, plus two intermissions, and is a clear, unambiguous call for revolutionary violence. It was directed by Fernando Solanas, 35, who wrote the script with Octavio Getino, 36. (Solanas also photographed, Getino did the sound.) Both of them have been making short films in the past decade. Their work here is sometimes crude, sometimes suspect, and is certainly not unfailingly gripping, but they have made an impressive and vehement film of immense energy.

It has three main sections, "Neocolonialism and Violence," "Act for Liberation," "Violence and Liberation," and there are numerous subsections. To criticize the argument of the film calls for a knowledge of Argentina—and a copy of the script!—to which I won't pretend. The thesis, varied and repeated, supported with newsclips, commentaries, quotations, statistics, and interviews, can be stated fairly simply:

Argentina began as a Spanish colony and, after independence (1816), continued as an economic and cultural colony of Great Britain. The US developed great interests there and, through this century US power has supplanted British power, though the British still have a strong cultural hold. (See the dress and amusements of the upper class.)

The first really Argentine politics in Argentina was Peronism. Perón was maligned abroad, principally by the US, because his economic developments and social welfare programs, his

payment of the foreign debt, all interfered with foreign investments and control. The US conspired in the overthrow of Perón, nominally as a pro-democratic move, actually to install a regime more friendly to its influence. Post-Perón governments, like earlier ones, have been oligarchic, plutocratic, militaristic, and brutally repressive, and have depended heavily on outside cultural and economic resources. The largest political party in Argentina is still the Peronist one; it can be the spearhead of a people's revolution which is what is needed in all Latin America. "Two, three, more Vietnams," as Che said.

All the above is subject to some question, even on the basis of superficial knowledge like mine. But the size of the Peronist bloc (30 to 40 percent of the population) and the possible alliance between Peronism and the far left were reported in *The New York Times*, by Malcolm W. Browne, on Oct. 3, 1970. Anti-Americanism is a great unifying force among political factions in Latin America. If it be argued that there are Latin-American countries much worse off than Argentina, there is also a country—Uruguay—that has always been much better off; and see the recent history of their Tupamaros.

Besides the questions that may nevertheless be asked of the film's facts, there are also questions about their presentation. What's the point of the gory slaughterhouse scenes? Argentina lives by beef production, and will do so presumably under the most popular government. We are told ominously—twice—that four people die a minute in Latin America. By my figures, this is also the rate in the US. We are told that true culture depends on the complete liberation of man—in which case we will never have true culture. (I would have thought that one reason for art is that man is *not* completely liberated, and will not be.) We are shown a man being beaten by a group of men in mufti, then being dragged face down through the mud. How do we know that he wasn't a CIA agent who tried to get into a Peronist meeting? There are many instances of beating and gassing where sympathy is asked immediately for the victims, with no fixing of facts.

But, keeping one's guard up as well as possible, one still is overcome by a sense of clutch, clutch, clutch, power in the hands of a few. As usual in all tyrannical situations, East or

West, black or white or brown, there is no slightest reason to believe that the oppressed are the moral superiors of their oppressors and will behave better if and when they triumph; but that's hardly a reason for the oppressed to accept things as they are, particularly if they are the majority.

So we come to the nub of the matter: the advocacy of violence. In politics, I don't see how a view on violence can be held as a universal absolute, which is why many of us who object to the Vietnam war still do not call ourselves pacifists. The Argentine peasant, who has inherited generations of wretchedness, who has seen women and children machine-gunned by police, is in a very different emotional and, I think, moral position, in regard to violence, from the American university student who is (rightly) protesting the campus presence of Dow Chemical. Although it is chilling to see this film come three times to a climactic call for violent revolution, I think that, to deplore it in terms of the nonviolent campaigns which one advocates in the US, is almost to verge on the smug. It's a bit like people on a diet telling the underfed that they're better off thin. If violence is immoral, as it objectively is, we still have to recognize that there are situations where objectivity is impossible; that there are situations where violence may have to be used to drive out even greater immoralities.

In terms of cinema technique and imagination, Solanas has done everything he could to make his work a film—to break out of the old booby-trap of propaganda: which is that propaganda films rarely change anyone's mind, they only heat up the previously convinced or the susceptible. True, he says halfway through Part Two that his film is not for mere spectators, but I think that by then he hopes to have hooked those—Latin-Americans, anyway—who started as mere spectators. He has worked to make his picture visually interesting. He used to work on advertising films, and one can see it in his use of varying optical techniques for the many words on screen. The editing is sharp, often with staccato intercutting of action and verbal message. The sounds and songs are effective. (I should probably specify that it's all in Spanish with subtitles.)

And sometimes the film is genuinely beautiful. There's a well-composed, deep-focus scene in which an old

continued

LYNCHEURG, VA.
NEWS

M - 19,032
S - 29,951

APR 11 1970

Penny Lernoux:

Argentina Accuses U.S. Of 'Spying'

BUENOS AIRES — While the United States has been accused of many things, "agricultural espionage" must rate as one of the most bizarre charges.

Unreal as the accusation may sound, it has led to the dismissal of the president and vice president of Argentina's Agricultural Research Institute and made the U. S. Department of Agriculture look like a rural representative of the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The cause of the current furor over "U. S. intervention in Argentine agriculture" is an innocent statistical report of Argentina's potential agricultural exports through 1980.

Similar studies on estimated food needs and production have been made jointly by the U. S. government and the governments of Australia, Austria, Brazil, Colombia, Britain, Holland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.

But this is the first time any complaint has been registered.

In each case, the aim of the study has been to assess medium and long-term demand and supply conditions. Entirely non-political, the studies are useful statistical predictions for international technical and scientific surveys on the world's food needs and ability to supply them.

The Argentines were first approached about the possibility of cooperating on such a study in 1964. Approved by both the Agriculture and Foreign ministries, a contract was signed between the National Institute of Agrarian Technology (INTA) and the U. S. Department of Agriculture.

The latter agreed to defray part of the cost and has paid INTA a total of \$38,731. Another \$8,571 is pending.

Far from constituting a secret espionage agreement, the terms of the contract were made public in 1966. Nor has the study itself, completed at the end of last year, ever been a secret.

However, when 10 draft copies of the study were delivered to the agricultural attache of the U. S. Embassy, INTA was convulsed by accusations and rumors.

"INTA has become a U. S. instrument to control our agricultural expansion," announced an Argentine economist

and former governmental agricultural adviser.

Others accused the United States of trying to depress Argentine agriculture through dumping in countries which are traditional clients of Argentina.

Pointing out that Argentina and the United States produce the same agricultural products, the critics denounced any technical cooperation which could give statistical information to Argentina's competitor.

Amid rumors that the government might take over INTA in displeasure at its "accomplice role," the institute's president and vice president, who originally authorized the study, announced their resignations.

The secretary of agriculture promptly accepted them.

Foreign and Argentine agricultural experts familiar with the internal workings of INTA believe the furor over the study is a screen to disguise personal and

professional jealousies within the organization.

It had been known for some time that Agricultural Secretary Lorenzo Raggio was thinking of replacing INTA's president. The scandal over the study provided a convenient excuse.

While essentially a tempest in a teapot, the INTA case does underline a widespread suspicion among Argentines that the United States is running a deliberate campaign to cripple Argentine agriculture.

Argentines, particularly ranchers, will grow choleric in discussions about U. S. restrictions on Argentine meat exports. They are convinced that the United States' refusal to buy fresh Argentine meat stems from U. S. cattlemen's fear of competition and not from the fact that the highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease is endemic here.

Argentines also criticize the United States' P. L. 480 wheat program although it represents foreign aid, not a commercial sale.

In cases where such wheat may endanger traditional Argentine markets, like Brazil, the United States has undertaken a gentleman's agreement with Argentina to protect the Argentines' commercial position by not flooding the market.

(Copley News Service)

28 MAR 1970

Prisoner Deal Again Refused by Argentina

BUENOS AIRES (AP)—The Argentine government refused again Friday to exchange two prisoners for a Paraguayan diplomat abducted Tuesday by three members of the leftist Argentine Liberation Front.

The statement, signed by President Juan Carlos Onganía, was the government's second refusal to trade the prisoners for Waldemar Sanchez, 56.

In recent months Brazil, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic have bowed to the demands of leftist kidnapers — three times to rescue American diplomats, once to save a Japanese consul-general and once to free the Guatemalan foreign minister.

River Dragged

After receiving an anonymous telephone tip that Sanchez, who was Paraguay's consul-general in Sao Paulo, had been murdered and dumped into a small river south of Buenos Aires, police dragged the river Friday but found nothing.

Wanted posters were distributed throughout the city, with photographs of seven young men said to be members of the front. The small revolutionary organization was formed last year by militants who broke away from the pro-Soviet Argentine Communist Party.

The front, in its most recent communique, said that Sanchez — "a CIA agent" — was not dead and might not be killed. It said he would be tried by a revolutionary tribunal.

The communique added that President Onganía and Paraguay's President Alfredo Stroessner — now here on an official visit — were "America's executioners" who declined to save Sanchez' life.

The communique added that threats to execute Sanchez by 8 a.m. Friday and to murder the managers of American firms in Argentina did not originate with the front.

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HERALD

M - 375,469
S - 468,167
JAN 25 1970



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Officer's Death Still a Mystery

Did a young Air Force intelligence officer from Miami, on a Fulbright Scholarship to Buenos Aires, stumble onto secrets that cost him his life?

The baffling six-year-old slaying of Lt. Earl Thomas Davis, 22, puts the question into sharp focus.

INFORMATION buried up to now in Air Force files, coupled with a recent letter from an American lieutenant colonel, now retired, who investigated the case in Argentina, points strongly to murder.

Young Davis was shot to death June 9, 1964, during a scuffle with two other men in a swank Buenos Aires night spot.

The victim, once the president of his senior class at North Miami Senior High School, was an honor graduate of the Air Force Academy and had won a Rhodes Scholarship for study in England. Death came one month before he was to enter Oxford University.

The Air Force notified Davis' parents, Marion and Maxine Davis of 548 S. Biscayne River Dr., that their son had died of an "accidental" gunshot wound. Press reports said Davis was shot trying to break up a fight involving a friend.

BUT DURING a brief visit to his home on leave a few weeks earlier, Lt. Davis had told his parents: "I'm onto something so big it scares me."

For four years, Argentine authorities ignored State Department requests for legal action. The accused killers were an off-duty Argentine police inspector and a known criminal with records of burglary and assault.

Finally, 18 months ago, the known criminal was convicted of "culpable homicide" and released on probation.

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MAXINE DAVIS has insisted that her son was murdered while engaged in intelligence work for the United States. The family has received no compensation, and Lt. Davis carried no insurance.

In her fight for some kind of indemnity, either from the U.S. or the government of Argentina, she has secured the aid of a Miami attorney, Maurice Jay Kutner.

Recently, Kutner secured the dead lieutenant's military file with the help of a sympathetic Air Force staff officer. Davis' personal 201 File shows that he was an intelligence officer with "top secret" clearance.

ALSO INCLUDED is a copy of an autopsy report by the director of Argentine national justice. Existence of the report, demolishing the Air Force's "accidental gunshot" claim, had never been disclosed.

Young Davis, in the fight for his life, suffered a dozen cuts and bruises about the body, was struck in the forehead with a gun butt and then shot in the head. Says the murderer was facing the victim and standing slightly to the right.

KUTNER, maintaining that Davis died serving his country in work possibly involving the CIA, sent a copy of the file to President Nixon. The only reply was a form letter from the Veterans Administration.

Air Force Lt. Col. T. D. Thompson, of Etna, Calif., now retired, the original investigator in Argentina, supports the family.

"There is no question in my mind," he wrote to Kutner, "that Tom was deliberately murdered by a professional killer" in a staged fight.

"THERE WERE many questions left unanswered by the Argentines; and I received no help from U.S. or Argentine authorities. My cause to see justice done was hopeless from the start . . ."

The nature of Davis' administrative assignment in Buenos Aires, Thompson said, carried the connotation of spy. "There has always been great doubt in my mind whether his death may not have been of that connection."

Thompson's own son was killed in Vietnam. He concluded: "Tom Davis was, as was my son, one of the greatest natural resources this country can produce. I feel a great sorrow that they had to die at such an early age."

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